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Abstract
Using Albert results we argue that we don’t need new physics to understand
Go¨delization. Albert quantum automaton can ”understand” both a formal system
and a Go¨del proposition which can’t be obtained within this system. There are
two significant conclusions. The first speaks ”against Penrose” whereas the second
speaks for him.
1 Introduction
In his two books [1] Penrose has argued that we need new physics in order to understand
the ”mind”. The crucial point of his approach is the Go¨del theorem and the natural ability
of our mind to do the Go¨del procedure which will be referred as Go¨dilization. What Go¨del
showed [2] was how to transcend any system of formalized rules. And because our mind
can do it, than it cannot be the ”formal system” itself. But our physics is nothing but
some (very complex and intricate) ”formal system” so it should be incomplete and we
need new physics which must include our mind in.
This is Penrose point, but I don’t think so (with the proviso in last Section). In this
report I argue that quantum-mechanical automaton do something which can be called
as Go¨delization. The argument below is far from being a rigorous proof but I believe
that it makes it rather plausible. The crucial point will be Albert approach to quantum-
mechanical automata [3]. What Albert showed was that ”there are some combination of
facts that can in principle be predicted by an (quantum-mechanical - A.Y.) automaton
only about itself” [3]. I’ll show that we can interpret it as an quantum automaton’s ability
to Go¨delize, so we don’t need new physics and ”new mind” to understand the mystery of
Go¨delization.
2 Go¨del theorem and quantum automaton
Let pn(w) is the propositional function applied to number w, where n will be called further
the Go¨del number. The strings of propositions which constitute a proof of some theorem
(for example, pn(w), if this statement is true in our system) be U(x), where x is the Go¨del
number of the proof. We denote our (classical) formal system as Wc.
The fundamental Go¨del proposition has the form
pw(w) =∼ ∃ x [U(x) proves pw(w)] , (1)
where ∼, ∃ are usual logical ”quantifiers”: ∃ mean ”there exists...such that”, ∼ mean ”it
is not so that...”.
What Go¨del showed was that (1) can be strongly written in the special formal system
Wc. It’s clear that pw(w) must be true as an arithmetical proposition (we suppose thatWc
is good, reconcilable system and there are not proofs of false statements) and therefore,
by the implication of the statement (1), it can’t be proves within the system Wc.
It is seems that Go¨del proposition (1) can be constructed in any formal system there-
fore any formal system will be limited by the Go¨del theorem but it is not the case for us
because we can Go¨delize and, consequently, transcend any system of formalized rules.
Now let consider the quantum machine which must proves theorems in formal system
Wc. Let S is quantum system with Hilbert space HS. We introduce observable Pk(w)
such that for any |w; k〉S ∈ HS it will be true that
Pk(w)|w; k〉S = k|w; k〉S. (2)
So eigenvalues of Pk(w) will be Go¨del numbers of the propositions pk(w). In the same
Hilbert space we define logical ”gaits” Uj. The entire list of all such ”gaits” will be referred
as quantum formal system Wq. We’ll say that quantum formal system Wq can proves the
proposition pk(w) (about number w) if such chain of ”gaits” exist
U = U(w, k) ≡
∏
j
Uj ,
that
|ψ〉S → |w; k〉S = U |ψ〉S, (3)
for some initial state |ψ〉S ∈ HS. In this case we can start out from |ψ〉S to find |w; k〉S;
then to measure the average value of Pk(w), to obtain the Go¨del number k
k = S〈ψ|U
+Pk(w)U |ψ〉S,
which allow one to reconstruct the proposition pk(w). It may not be simple task but we
can do it as a matter of principle.
When this procedure is realizable one? To understand this we suppose that the quan-
tum formal system Wq is universal one and it is suitable for testing |w; k〉S to be solution
of the (2). Substituting |w; k〉S in place of |ψ〉S into the (3) we must obtain the same
vector 1
U |w; k〉S = u(w; k)|w; k〉S, (4)
so it must be
[Pk(w), U ] = 0. (5)
The equation (5) is at one with uncertainty relation. Indeed, let the quantum formal
system Wq is instructed to measure (or calculate: it is the same in our case) the value of
pk(w). The observable of Wq is U so both Pk(w) and U must be measurable simultane-
ously. This is another way to obtain (5).
What about Go¨del proposition (1)? It is propositional function applied to number w
with Go¨del number w which can’t be obtained (proved) in formal systems Wc and Wq.
Write Pw ≡ Pw(w). It would be
[Pw, U ] 6= 0. (6)
Otherwise we can use U to find |w〉S ≡ |w;w〉S and, after all, to calculate Go¨del proposi-
tion pw(w). But it is impossible because of the Go¨del theorem.
1May be one get another vector |w;m〉S with m 6= k. In this case we can redefine U to exclude this
outcome.
3 Albert quantum automaton and auto-description
Let consider the automaton A which is instructed to measure and to record the value of
Pw and U . It being known that
U |ψ〉S = u|ψ〉S, |ψ〉S =
∑
w
cw|w〉S, Pw|w〉S = w|w〉S, (6)
where Pw, are observables which are comparing to Go¨del propositions pw. Let us take the
state of the system S to be |w〉S. When measurement of the Pw is finished, the state of
the composite system S + A will be [3]
|w(1)〉 = |w〉S
⊗
|w〉Pw, (7)
where |w〉Pw ∈ HA, HA is the Hilbert space of the automaton A and |w〉Pw is the eigen-
vector of the ”Albert observable” G(Pw) (in [3] Albert has used another notation),
G(Pw)|w〉Pw = w˜|w〉Pw . (8)
This observable measures the value predicted by the automaton for the Pw. The prediction
will accurate if
E(Pw)|w
(1)〉 = (w˜ − w) |w(1)〉 = 0, (9)
with
E(Pw) ≡ G(Pw)− Pw. (10)
Below we’ll restricting the accurate predictions (w˜ = w).
Albert observables do commute with the rest observables 2,
[G(Pw), Pw] = [G(Pw), U ] = [G(Pw), G(U)] = [G(U), Pw] = [G(U), U ] = 0,
so
[E(Pw), E(U)] = [Pw, U ] 6= 0, (11)
what is at one with the uncertainty relations and, at the same time, with the Go¨del
theorem. Indeed, a Go¨del proposition pw has no proof within formal system Wq so the
predictions about U and Pw can’t both be accurate. Thus we have the same situation
as above. If that’s the case, why did we introduce the second quantum automaton A?
This because Albert has demonstrated that quantum automaton A can transcend the
restriction (11) in a certain sense. To do it the automaton must measure something
about itself.
Let us take the initial state of the system S to be the eigenvector of U : |ψ〉S. It mean
that Wq is ”in action” and Pw is beyond the system. In spite of this the A is instructed
to measure Pw. When this measurement is finished the state of composite system S + A
will be
|ψ(1)〉 =
∑
w
cw|w
(1)〉, (12)
because of linearity of quantum-mechanical equations. In (12) |w(1)〉 are defined by the
(7). Now one can introduce new observable U (1) such that
U (1)|ψ(1)〉 = u(1)|ψ(1)〉. (13)
2We stress that G(Pw) is not the function of the observable Pw as well as G(U) is not function of U .
What is the U (1)? We can call it the ”gait” of new formal system W (1)q which is, partially,
recorded in the memory of the automaton A. It’s clear that
[
Pw, U
(1)
]
6= 0, (14)
so its seems that the new formal system W (1)q is not more powerful system that initial one
(Wq). But now, if the automaton will measure the observable U
(1) then we get
|ψ(1)〉 → |ψ(2)〉 = |ψ(1)〉U (1)
⊗
|ψ(1)〉, (15)
(see (7)), where
G(U (1))|ψ(1)〉U (1) = u
(1)|ψ(1)〉U (1), (16)
therefore
E(Pw)|ψ
(2)〉 = E(U (1))|ψ(2)〉 = 0, (17)
thought Pw and U
(1) do not commute (see (11))!
Thus the automaton in the state |ψ(2)〉 can predict accurate both Pw and U
(1). I believe
we can call it ”Godelization” in a sense. It is not mean that the automaton can proves
pw using within W
(1)
q . What is implied by this that Pw (and therefore the proposition pw)
and U (1) are jointly satisfiable for the automaton A. In other words, the automaton A
can ”understand” both a Go¨del proposition pw and a formal system W
(1)
q . The classical
automaton can’t do it. To force classical automaton ”understand” pw and W
(1)
c we need
to load it with more powerful ”formal system” W˜c. It is not the case when we deal with
quantum automaton.
An last but not least. The Go¨lelization above is the personal file of the automaton A.
The observable U (1) and observable Pw are external ones for the another automaton A˜,
so it can’t to ’understand’ both U (1) and Pw. To Go¨delize it must find its personal state
|ψ˜(2)〉.
4 Conclusion
There are two significant conclusions. The first speaks ”against Penrose” whereas the
second speaks for him.
Against. We don’t need new physics to understand Go¨delization. Albert quantum au-
tomaton can ”understand” both a formal system and a Go¨del proposition which can’t be
obtained within this system.
For. If Go¨delization is unalgorithmic procedure then, at least, we can admit that quan-
tum mechanics really containing ”something unalgorithmic”.
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